During conversation, interactants draw on their shared communicative context and history ("common ground") to help decide what to say next, tailoring utterances based on their knowledge of what the listener knows. The use of common ground draws on an understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others to create and update a model of what is known by the other person, employing cognitive processes such as theory of mind. We tested the hypothesis that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a neural region involved in processing and interpreting social and emotional information, would be critical for the development and use of common ground. We studied seven patients with bilateral vmPFC damage and seven age-, sex-, and education-matched healthy comparison participants, each interacting with a familiar partner. Across 24 trials, participants verbally directed their partners how to arrange a set of 12 abstract tangram cards. Our hypothesis was not supported: the vmPFC and healthy comparison groups showed similar development and use of common ground, evident in reduction in time and words used to describe the cards, similar increases in the use of definite references (e.g., the horse), and comparable use of verbal play (playful language) in their interactions. These results argue against the idea that the vmPFC is critical for the development and use of common ground in social interaction. We propose that a cognitive and neuroanatomical bifurcation in theory of mind processes may explain this outcome. The vmPFC may be important for affective theory of mind (the ability to understand another's feelings); however, the development and use of common ground in social interaction may place higher demands on the ability to understand another's knowledge, or cognitive theory of mind, which may not require the vmPFC.
a b s t r a c t
During conversation, interactants draw on their shared communicative context and history ("common ground") to help decide what to say next, tailoring utterances based on their knowledge of what the listener knows. The use of common ground draws on an understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others to create and update a model of what is known by the other person, employing cognitive processes such as theory of mind. We tested the hypothesis that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a neural region involved in processing and interpreting social and emotional information, would be critical for the development and use of common ground. We studied seven patients with bilateral vmPFC damage and seven age-, sex-, and education-matched healthy comparison participants, each interacting with a familiar partner. Across 24 trials, participants verbally directed their partners how to arrange a set of 12 abstract tangram cards. Our hypothesis was not supported: the vmPFC and healthy comparison groups showed similar development and use of common ground, evident in reduction in time and words used to describe the cards, similar increases in the use of definite references (e.g., the horse), and comparable use of verbal play (playful language) in their interactions. These results argue against the idea that the vmPFC is critical for the development and use of common ground in social interaction. We propose that a cognitive and neuroanatomical bifurcation in theory of mind processes may explain this outcome. The vmPFC may be important for affective theory of mind (the ability to understand another's feelings); however, the development and use of common ground in social interaction may place higher demands on the ability to understand another's knowledge, or cognitive theory of mind, which may not require the vmPFC.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Conversation, the cornerstone of social interaction, requires the orchestration of numerous cognitive abilities. For example, as an interaction unfolds, individuals must update and integrate new information and place utterances into the larger communicative context and the shared histories of the interactants (Body, 2007; Clark, 1992) . Speakers draw on this shared communicative context and history to decide what to say next, tailoring utterances based on their knowledge of what the listener knows (Clark & Murphy, 1982; Horton, 2007 ; although see Keysar, 2007) . For example, the successful use of a definite reference (e.g., the car) depends on speaker and listeners jointly believing that the referent is part * Corresponding author at: Department of Neurology, University of Iowa, 200
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of their shared communicative history or is identifiable from the shared context/environment (Clark & Marshall, 1978) . This knowledge of shared information is referred to as common ground (Clark, 1992; Clark & Marshall, 1978) . Decades of research have been devoted towards documenting and understanding the role of common ground in conversation. To study how conversational partners develop and use common ground, many investigators have used an experimental setup that involves a collaborative referencing paradigm, where two participants work together across numerous trials to establish names for a set of novel objects, (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969) . A consistent finding is that the development of common ground is displayed as participants create and use unique labels for the objects which simplify and shorten across trials. Participants require less time to complete the task and begin to use definite references (e.g., the camel) to signal their confidence that the referent is part of shared knowledge (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Yule, 1997) . The findings from 0028-3932/$ -see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.11.012
